In the television show Deal or No Deal an individual faces a sequence of binary choices between a risky lottery with prizes of up to half a million euros and a monetary amount for certain. The decisions of 500 contestants from Italian and British versions of the show are used to test the predictions of ten decision theories: risk neutrality, expected utility theory, the fanning-out hypothesis (weighted utility theory, transitive skew-symmetric bilinear utility theory), prospect theory, regret theory, rank-dependent expected utility theory, Yaari's dual model, prospective reference theory and disappointment aversion theory. Both Italian and British contestants violate assumptions of risk neutrality and loss aversion. We find evidence of simple nonlinear probability weighting but no evidence of rank-dependent probability weighting or disappointment aversion. Observed decisions are consistent with regret aversion and there is strong evidence for the fanning-out hypothesis.
Introduction
Well-known violations of expected utility theory such as the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953) motivated the development of numerous generalized non-expected utility theories (e.g. Starmer, 2000) . The merits of these decision theories were largely assessed according to their goodness of fit to the behavioral patterns observed in the laboratory experiments (e.g. Harless and Camerer, 1994; Hey and Orme, 1994) . In this paper we test the predictions of ten decisions theories in an experiment with a more diversified subject pool (drawn from the adult population of Italy and United Kingdom) and significantly higher monetary incentives (prizes of up to half a million euros) than in conventional laboratory experiments.
In the television show Deal or No Deal contestants make several choices between a risky lottery and an amount for certain. Risky lotteries, which contestants face in the show, are determined by chance events. This allows us to divide contestants across randomized treatments. Given an individual, whose preferences are described by a particular decision theory, we construct a treatment where she faces relatively unattractive lotteries (higher likelihood of choosing a sure amount) and a treatment where she faces relatively attractive lotteries (higher likelihood of choosing a risky lottery). By comparing behavioral patterns across two treatments, we test the predictions of decision theories without making any assumptions about their parametric forms. Natural experiments, provided by television shows, are often used in economic research to draw conclusions about various aspects of human behavior.
1 Television shows provide an appealing material for economists, because these shows are often structured as strategic games and well-defined decision problems (Metrick, 1995) . For example, Bennett and Hickman (1993) and Berk, Hughson and Vandezande (1996) employ the natural laboratory of The Prize is Right to test for optimal information updating and rational bidding strategies correspondingly. Levitt (2004) and Antonovics, Arcidiancono and Walsh (2005) examine discrimination in The Weakest Link. Gertner (1993 ), Metrick (1995 , and Beetsma and Schotman (2001) Mulino et al. (2007a Mulino et al. ( , 2007b ) measure risk attitudes and study the endowment effect in the Australian version of Deal or No Deal. Andersen et al. (2006a Andersen et al. ( , 2006b ) analyze the behavior of British Deal or No Deal contestants. Botti et al. (2006) study risk attitudes and unobserved heterogeneity in Affari Tuoi. Deck et al. (2007) measure risk attitudes of contestants in the Mexican version of the show (Vas o No Vas) .
All these studies conduct a parametric estimation by assuming specific functional forms of expected utility (e.g. constant relative or absolute risk aversion) and/or other generalized non-expected utility theories. In contrast, this paper concentrates on nonparametric analysis of contestants' decisions. The importance of this approach has been emphasized in Pogrebna (2006, 2007) . Using a non-parametric technique, Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2006) contestants do not exhibit lower risk aversion when facing gains of low probability.
The main findings of this paper can be summarized as follows. Deal or No Deal contestants are clearly not risk neutral, which is, probably, not surprising given high stakes of the show. The decisions of contestants are apparently not affected by foregone outcomes, which is consistent with expected utility theory (or prospective reference theory). We find that contestants are more likely to choose a monetary amount for sure when risky lotteries improve in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. This confirms the fanning-out hypothesis of weighted utility theory and transitive skew symmetric bilinear utility theory.
At the end of the show, Deal or No Deal contestants experience ex post regret significantly less frequently than ex post rejoicing. This finding is consistent with the assumption of regret theory that individuals anticipate future regret and try to avoid it.
We find evidence of nonlinear probability weighting in a simple form but not in a rankdependent form. Deal or No Deal contestants also do not appear to be averse to receiving disappointingly low outcomes of a risky lottery. Finally, we find that Yaari's dual model cannot describe the behavior of Italian contestants in the last round of the show but it can rationalize the behavior of British contestants.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the rules of television shows Affari Tuoi and Deal or No Deal UK. Section 3 presents the data generated in this natural experiment and the demographic characteristics of contestants.
The predictions of ten well-known decision theories are tested in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Description of the Television Show

Format of Affari Tuoi Television Show
Affari Tuoi is the Italian version of the well-known Endemol television show Deal or No Deal. It is aired six days a week with an exception of Sunday on the first channel of Italian television RAI Uno. In order to become a contestant, interested candidates have to call a countrywide selection center. In other words, all contestants self-select into the show. According to Bombardini and Trebbi (2005) , contestants are selected from the pool of interested candidates based on two criteria: entertaining appearance and income (wealthy candidates are discarded). Contestants know the list of potential prizes (i.e. Figure 1 ) but they do not know the content of each box. In every episode four small monetary prizes, ranging from €0.01
to €500, are substituted with token gifts, such as, for example, an orange instead of €0.20
or a puppy instead of €100. This substitution is done primarily for entertainment purposes and any contestant can reject a token gift and opt for its monetary equivalent.
Every television episode consists of two phases -the selection phase and the game itself. During the selection phase, contestants receive one multiple-choice general knowledge question. The contestant, who is the first to answer this question correctly, is selected to play the game. 3 During the game, this contestant keeps her own box and opens the remaining boxes one by one. Once a box is opened, the prize sealed inside is publicly revealed and deleted from the list of possible prizes shown on Figure 1 .
The more boxes the contestant opens, the more information she obtains about the distribution of possible prizes inside her own box. After opening several boxes the contestant receives an offer from the "bank". This offer can be either a monetary price for the content of her box or the possibility to exchange her box for any of the remaining sealed boxes. 4 Prior to February 9, 2006 in Affari Tuoi the "bank" made offers to the contestant when, respectively, 14, 11, 8, 5 and 2 boxes remained unopened (including contestant's own box). Starting from February 9, 2006 contestant received offers when, correspondingly, 17, 14, 11, 8, 5 and 2 boxed remained sealed.
The remaining 19 contestants (waiting contestants) continue to participate in the next television episode.
The contestant who was selected to play the game is replaced by a new contestant from the same region. The new contestant is selected from a pool of volunteers who called the selection center. 4 Official rules of Affari Tuoi require the "bank" to offer exchange option at least once in every television episode. Therefore, the first offer that the "bank" makes is always the exchange offer. Before February 9, 2006, the first offer was always made after the contestant opened six boxes. Starting from February 9, 2006, the first offer was made after the contestant opened three boxes. 5 Bombardini and Trebbi (2005) , Botti et al. (2006) and Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2007) provide a detailed description of the timing of "bank" offers in the Italian version of Deal or No Deal.
Monetary offers are fairly predictable across episodes and follow a general pattern.
In the early stages of the game, they are smaller than the expected value of possible prizes.
As the game progresses, the gap between the expected value and monetary offer decreases and often disappears when there are two unopened boxes left. The game terminates when either the contestant accepts the price offered by the "bank" or when all boxes are opened. In the former case, the content of all remaining unopened boxes is revealed. In the latter case, the contestant leaves with the content of her box, which is opened last.
Format of Deal or No Deal UK Television Show
Twenty two contestants from various parts of the UK participate in each episode 6 .
The prizes range from £0.01 to £250,000 (Figure 2 ) 7 . They are randomly assigned to 22
boxes by an independent adjudicator. However, an independent adjudicator does not assign boxes to contestants. After the prizes are distributed across boxes and boxes are sealed, contestants choose their boxes at random by drawing numbered ping-pong balls. The British version of the show does not have a selection phase. The contestant is pre-selected by the producers and, therefore, it is quite rare for contestants to wait for more than 30 shows before they receive an opportunity to play the game. However, waiting contestants do not know in advance when they will be selected.
The game itself follows a similar procedure as Affari Tuoi. Figure 6 and Figure 7 in the Appendix).
"Bank" monetary offers
A precise mechanism of setting "bank" monetary offers is not revealed in the show regulations. Bombardini and Trebbi (2005) suggest that offers in Affari Tuoi can be modeled as informative signals about the prize sealed inside a contestant's box that the "bank" sends to the contestant. De Roos and Sarafidis (2006) conduct a regression analysis of "bank" offers in the Australian version of Deal or No Deal and find that the variability in "bank" offers is largely explained by the expected value of the remaining prizes but not by the prize hidden inside a contestant's briefcase. Given these different models of "bank" offers suggested in the literature, we investigate the determinants of "bank" offers in our recorded sample. Table 2 and Table 3 This dummy variable takes a value of one if the "bank" makes an offer when another earlier offer has already been accepted by contestant so that the later offer is not binding.
The second column of Table 2 and Table 3 demonstrates that around 85% of total variability in monetary offers in Affari Tuoi and around 80% of total variability in monetary offers in Deal or No Deal UK is explained by the expected value and the number of possible prizes left. In both versions of the show the "bank" makes higher offers when the number of possible prizes decreases, i.e. the game approaches the end.
Regression coefficient on the standard deviation of possible prizes is also significant (the more dispersed are the prizes, the lower is the offer). However, regression coefficient of the prize hidden inside a contestant's box is never statistically significant, i.e. there is no information content in the "bank" offers. 
Description of explanatory variable Regression coefficient (standard error) Lottery specific variables:
Constant
Testing Predictions of Decision Theories
The predictions of ten well-known decision theories are tested in the natural experiment provided by the television shows Affari Tuoi and Deal or No Deal UK. We selected a typical menu of decision theories that are usually considered in existing studies that investigate which model of risky choice describes the behavioral patterns observed in the conventional laboratory experiments best (Table 4 ). Since every contestant makes only few observed choice decisions, we use a between-subject design to test the predictions of the selected decision theories (except for risk neutrality and the assumption of loss aversion of prospect theory that can be tested for every contestant). This paper follows a non-parametric approach, i.e. we do not make any assumptions about specific functional forms for utility functions, probability weighting functions etc. 11 Similar to our study, Starmer (1992) and Harless & Camerer (1994) tested fanning out hypothesis of weighted utility and skew-symmetric bilinear utility theory. 12 Hey and Orme (1994) also considered the quadratic utility model of Chew et al. (1991) that is derived from a mixture symmetry axiom. However, there appears to be no testable implication of this theory in the context of this natural experiment.
Investigated in experimental study
We exploit the outcomes of random events to construct artifactual treatments. In every episode contestants face a distribution of monetary prizes, which is constructed by random elimination of prizes from the initial list of possible prizes (e.g. Figure 1 and Figure 2 ). For every decision theory (except for risk neutrality that is tested within subject) we identify two classes of prize distributions: those that yield relatively low utility and those that yield relatively high utility. Contestants are allocated across artifactual treatments based on the type of prize distribution that they face in the game.
As usual in a between-subject design, the predictions of decision theories are tested by comparing contestants' behavior across two corresponding artifactual treatments.
Deal or No
Deal contestants are confronted with random prize distributions but they do not receive random offers from the "bank". Therefore, we have to check that the "bank" does not discriminate between artifactual treatments. Table 2 and Table 3 show that the "bank" makes significantly higher offers when contestants face a distribution with a smaller number of possible prizes. Thus, we cannot pool contestants, who face a distribution with many possible prizes (at the beginning of the game), with contestants, who face a distribution with only few prizes (at the end of the game), in one treatment.
Monetary offers become relatively more attractive as the number of possible prizes decreases. Therefore, only those contestants, who are relatively less risk averse, are likely to remain in the game with a small number of possible prizes. Relatively more risk averse contestants are likely to face only distributions with a large number of prizes.
Therefore, we test each decision theory separately for a subgroup of contestants, who face a distribution of two possible prizes, five possible prizes etc. Since we always compare behavior across two treatments constructed from the same subgroup, selfselection across different subgroups does not create any bias for our between-subject test.
Risk Neutrality
Risk neutrality is arguably the simplest decision theory. A risk neutral individual always prefers the lottery with the highest expected value of possible outcomes.
Formally, utility of a risky lottery ( )
,..., 1 ∈ , with probability n 1 is given by ∑ = n i i n x 1 . Table 5 shows that an overwhelming majority of "bank" monetary offers (97.3%
in Affari Tuoi and 99.4% in Deal or No Deal UK) is below the expected value of the prizes that a contestant is still able to win when the offer is made.
13 Contestants accepting such less than actuarially fair offers violate the assumption of risk neutrality. Contestants rejecting offers, which are higher than the expected value, violate risk neutrality if this is the last possible offer in the game (offer is made when only two boxes remain unopened).
Contestants rejecting a more than actuarially fair offer, which is not the last possible offer in the game, do not necessarily violate risk neutrality-they may simply expect that future offers will be even more generous. Overall, 63 out of 114 Italian contestants (55.3%) and 278 out of 386 British contestants (72%) violated risk neutrality (overwhelming majority of these contestants accepted offers lower than the expected value of possible prizes). 13 It appears that several more than actuarially fair offers resulted from rounding of "bank" offers and they do not reflect a systematic policy of the "bank" to make occasional "kind" offers. For example, in Affari Tuoi, on one occasion, the "bank" offered €40 when the expected value of three prizes was €36.83 and on the second occasion the "bank" offered €17,000 when the expected value of eight prizes was €16,300. In Deal or No Deal UK, the "bank" made six more than actuarially fair offers: £800, £1,500, £2,500, £13,000, £15,001 and £28,000 when the expected value of remaining prizes was £761, £1,445, £2,476, £12,500, £14,719 and £23,211 respectively. 14 Due to rounding of "bank" offers, several offers were just few pennies below the expected value of outstanding prizes. For example, seven offers in Affari Tuoi and thirteen offers in Deal or No Deal UK were less than 1% below the expected value and contestants accepted only one and seven of these offers respectively. Thus, a large number of accepted less than actuarially fair offers cannot be explained by the fact that some of these offers were just marginally lower than the expected value of possible prizes.
Affari Tuoi
Expected Utility and Prospective Reference Theory
According According to prospective reference theory, an individual maximizes a weighted average of the expected utility of a lottery and the expected utility from receiving every possible outcome of the lottery with equal probability (Viscusi, 1989) . Formally, utility of a risky lottery ( ) 15 Instead of testing the prediction of expected utility theory, we look for patterns in the data that are difficult to reconcile within the expected utility framework.
Expected utility maximizers take into account only the distribution of possible prizes, a current offer and the expectation of future offers. Thus, their decisions are not influenced by monetary prizes that were already eliminated from the list of possible prizes. However, Post et al. (2004) who experienced recent elimination of large prizes, reject "bank" offers more often.
Since the "bank" typically makes the next monetary offer after a contestant opens another three boxes, we consider if contestant's decision to accept or reject the offer depends on the number of large prizes that were discovered in the last three boxes opened prior to the decision. We define a large prize both in absolute terms (any prize higher or equal to €5,000 in Affari Tuoi and higher or equal to £1,000 in Deal or No Deal UK 17 )
and in relative terms (three largest prizes in the distribution of possible prizes that the contestant faced before opening three boxes). Table 2 shows that "bank" monetary offers in Affari Tuoi do not depend on the number of foregone large prizes, both for large prizes in absolute and relative terms.
Therefore, if Affari Tuoi contestants do not take foregone outcomes into account, we can expect similar rates of acceptance/rejection of "bank" offers when large prizes are 15 For every contestant there are at most only 7 weak inequalities restricting individual utility function and at least 9 outcomes, for which utilities can be freely chosen (given that utility of 2 outcomes is normalized). 16 Notice that this finding does not necessarily contradict to the expected utility theory. It rather shows that subjective utility function does not exhibit a constant coefficient of relative risk aversion. Instances, when a contestant rejects a more than actuarially fair offer only to accept later a less than actuarially fair offer, also do not necessarily contradict to the expected utility theory if utility function is concave over one range of outcomes and convex over another (e.g. Markowitz, 1952) . 17 Figure 1 offers a natural threshold for distinguishing between large and small prizes in Affari Tuoi. Prizes that are above or equal to €5,000 are significantly (at least 10 times) higher than all prizes below €5,000. In Deal or No Deal UK all prizes higher or equal to £1,000 are highlighted in red color (e.g. Figure 2 ) and are consistently framed in every episode as favorable outcomes (as opposed to prizes below £1,000).
eliminated and when they remain in the game. accept "bank" offers depending on the number of large prizes that they discover in the last three opened boxes. In Affari Tuoi acceptance rate for "bank" offers does not depend on the number of foregone large prizes if they are defined in absolute terms. Generally, this also holds when large prizes are defined in relative terms. The only significant effect can be found in the behavior of Italian contestants, who face a distribution of five prizes.
Contestants, who eliminated one of the highest ranked prizes, accept offers significantly more often than contestants, who were lucky not to eliminate any of large prizes. Convincing evidence of such path-dependence can be found only if contestants accept offers more frequently after eliminating large prizes. We find only one example of such behavior. Unlucky contestants, who face a distribution of two prizes after eliminating three prizes greater or equal to £1000, accept "bank" offers significantly more often than contestants, who eliminated only one large prize. Thus, in both versions of the show there is no strong evidence of path-dependence, which is consistent with expected utility theory.
4.3.
Fanning-Out (Weighted Utility Theory, Transitive Skew-Symmetric Bilinear Utility Theory) Machina (1982) proposed the fanning-out hypothesis that individuals do not become less risk averse when lotteries improve in the sense of the first-order stochastic dominance. Several decision theories such as weighted utility theory (e.g. Chew and McCrimmon, 1979, Chew, 1983) and transitive skew-symmetric bilinear utility theory (e.g. Fishburn, 1983 Fishburn, , 1988 incorporate the fanning-out hypothesis by restricting their general utility functionals to explain well-know violations of the expected utility theory such as the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953) or common ratio effect (e.g. Starmer, 2000) .
To test the fanning-out hypothesis, we consider all contestants who received a monetary offer for a distribution of eight, five and two possible prizes 19 . In each of these three cases, we select a separating lottery and compare the acceptance (rejection) rate for "bank" offers in two groups of contestants. In the first group, contestants face a distribution of possible prizes, which is stochastically dominated by the separating lottery. In the second group, contestants face a distribution of possible prizes, which stochastically dominates the separating lottery. The separating lottery is selected to maximize the minimum number of observations in two groups 20 .
Contestants are allocated across the two groups at random (as a result of chance events). Table 2 shows that the "bank" does not make higher offers to Affari Tuoi contestants in group 2. In fact, at 5% significance level we cannot reject the hypothesis that the "bank" makes higher offers to group 1 of Affari Tuoi contestants. Hypothesis I Contestants in both groups accept "bank" offers equally often.
Hypothesis II (fanning out)
Contestants in the second group accept monetary offers from the "bank" more often than contestants in the first group. the data from our natural experiment strongly support the fanning-out hypothesis.
Although this finding may cast doubt on the descriptive validity of expected utility theory, it does not necessarily contradict the expected utility framework. The reason is that contestants in groups 1 and 2 generally face lotteries over different monetary prizes.
Thus, expected utility maximizers with convex (or linear) utility function over small outcomes and concave utility function over large outcomes may also exhibit this type of fanning-out. Note that evidence of fanning-out that invalidates expected utility theory comes from conventional laboratory experiments where subjects face lotteries over the same outcomes (usually, three-outcome lotteries located inside the probability triangle). Table 7 Number of contestants accepting ("YES") and rejecting ("NO") "bank" offers in group 1 (G1) and group 2 (G2). All contestants in G2 face distributions that stochastically dominate distributions faced by contestants in G1.
Affari
Prospect Theory
According to prospect theory, an individual obtains a simplified representation of a decision problem in the editing phase and subsequently evaluates edited lotteries in the evaluation phase (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) . Two editing operations that are relevant in the context of this experiment are simplification (monetary outcomes are rounded up) and combination (probabilities associated with identical outcomes are added together). In the evaluation phase, edited lotteries are evaluates by means of an S-shaped value function and inverse-S shaped probability weighting function. The probability weighting function overvalues small probabilities and undervalues medium and high probabilities. Note that in cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) this effect holds only for extreme outcomes (highest ranked and lowest ranked gains and losses). We will test rank-dependent nonlinear probability weighting in section 4.6 below.
A rather natural implication of the editing phase in the contest of this natural experiment is that Affari Tuoi and Deal or No Deal UK contestants round up numerous small outcomes in the left section of Figure 1 and Figure 2 respectively and combine their probabilities in one joint probability. 21 This joint probability is overweighted, if small, and underweighted otherwise. Thus, prospect theory predicts that Affari Tuoi and Deal or No Deal UK contestants facing a low chance of receiving a small prize (less or equal than €500 and £750 respectively) are likely to accept "bank" offers more frequently than the contestants facing a high chance of ending up with a small prize.
To test this prediction of prospect theory, we consider the decisions of Affari Tuoi contestants, who received an offer for a distribution of eight and five possible prizes.
22
21 Figure 1 and Figure 2 also show that prizes are framed in a way that encourages such editing. All small prizes on the left hand side are highlighted in one color (blue). 22 We do not consider the decisions of contestants who received a monetary offer for a distribution of eleven and two prizes because there is no sufficient variability of the data in the first case (only one We conduct a similar test for British Deal or No Deal contestants. Table 9 shows how many of them accepted and rejected monetary offers for a distribution of eight and five possible prizes depending on their chances of receiving a small prize (defined as £750 or less). Contestants, who face a low chance of receiving a small prize, appear to be significantly more likely to accept a monetary offer from the "bank". For instance, British contestants, who are confronted with a probability of 1/5 or 2/5 of receiving £750 or less, accept "bank" offers significantly more frequently than contestants for whom the corresponding probability is 3/5 or 4/5. At the same time contestants, who face five to eight odds of receiving £750 or less, tend to accept monetary offers significantly less often than contestants for who the respective chances are 3/8 and 1/2.
contestant accepted a monetary offer for a distribution of eleven prizes) and contestants do not face outcomes of low probability in the second case. 23 Similar results hold when only the probabilities of prizes below or equal to €250, €100 etc. are combined. 
Monetary offers for a distribution of eight possible prizes
Regret Theory (Non-Transitive Skew-Symmetric Bilinear Utility Theory)
According to regret theory, an individual experiences regret (rejoicing) when a lottery that she has chosen delivers lower (higher) outcome than the ex post outcome of the lottery that she did not choose. Ex ante, an individual anticipates future regret or rejoicing and attempts to minimize ex post regret (e.g. Loomes and Sugden, 1987) . Loomes et al., 1992) .
Since contestants always choose between one risky and one degenerate lottery, i.e.
between two statistically independent lotteries, regret theory also coincides with (nontransitive) skew-symmetric bilinear utility theory (e.g. Loomes and Sugden, 1987) .
To test the prediction of regret theory, we compare the difference between final earnings of contestants and the outcome that they would have received if they had indicates that median experienced regret is significantly lower than median experienced rejoicing for decisions that contestants make when eight boxes remain unopened (and for decisions that British contestants make when five boxes remain unopened). Thus, contestants are quite successful in avoiding ex post regret, which is consistent with the assumption of regret aversion (convexity of a skew-symmetric utility function). 
Rank-Dependent Expected Utility Theory
According to rank-dependent expected utility theory (RDEU), utility of a risky
, is given by
is a probability weighting function and R R : → u is utility function (e.g. Quiggin, 1982) . Probability weighting function is strictly increasing and satisfies boundary conditions ( ) 0 0 = w and ( ) 1 1 = w . Additionally, it has a characteristic inverse-S shape being concave for low probabilities ( 3 1 < p ) and convex for medium and high
are above the reference point of an individual, the prediction of RDEU is identical to the prediction of cumulative prospect theory (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) .
The inverse-S shape of the probability weighting function implies that individuals overvalue small probabilities of extreme outcomes (i.e. highest ranked and lowest ranked outcomes) and undervalue medium and high probabilities of extreme outcomes. Consider an individual facing a risky lottery that delivers the highest possible outcome with a small probability and this outcome is significantly higher (in terms of utility) than the second highest possible outcome. RDEU predicts that an individual overvalues such a lottery, i.e.
she is likely to exhibit risk-seeking behavior. Similarly, an individual undervalues a risky lottery that yields the lowest possible outcome with a small probability if this outcome is significantly lower (in terms of utility) than the second lowest possible outcome of a lottery. In this case an individual is more likely to exhibit risk-averse behavior.
To test the predictions of RDEU, we consider the decisions of Affari Tuoi and Deal or No Deal contestants, who received a monetary offer for a distribution of eight and five possible prizes (see footnote 22). These contestants face risky lotteries that yield every possible prize with probability 0.2 and 0.125, respectively. We consider the acceptance/rejection rate for "bank" monetary offers across four groups of contestants.
Contestants are divided across four groups depending on the risky lottery that they face:
Group 3 The highest possible prize of a lottery is at least ten times higher than the second highest prize of the lottery.
Group 4 Two highest possible prizes of a lottery are adjacent prizes (e.g. in Figure 1 or Figure 2 ). If lottery has eight possible prizes, the three highest ranked prizes are adjacent.
Group 5
The second lowest possible prize of a lottery is at least ten times higher than the lowest prize of the lottery.
Group 6
Two lowest possible prizes of a lottery are adjacent prizes (e.g. in Figure 1 or Figure 2 ). If lottery has eight possible prizes, the three lowest ranked prizes are adjacent.
24 Table 2 and Table 3 show that the "bank" does not discriminate between members of groups 3-6 when making offers. RDEU then predicts that offers are rejected more frequently in group 3 than in group 4. Probability of receiving a large prize is 20% or 12.5% in group 3 and 40% or 37.5% in group 4. This probability is overweighted to a stronger extent in group 3 than in group 4, 25 leading to a higher rejection of "bank" offers. Similarly, RDEU predicts that "bank" offers are accepted more frequently in group 5 than in group 6. Table 10 shows that there is no systematic difference in acceptance/rejection of "bank" monetary offers across groups 3 and 4 and across groups 5 and 6 of Affari Tuoi contestants. Table 11 shows that there is also no significant difference in acceptance of 
Yaari's Dual Model
According to Yaari's dual model, utility of a risky lottery ( ) 
, the more likely is a contestant to accept a "bank" offer for a given probability weight ( ) 2 1 w .
Affari Tuoi and Deal or No
Deal UK contestants face two-outcome lotteries in the last stage of the game. "Bank" monetary offers steadily improve towards the end of the show when less and less boxes remain unopened (e.g. Table 2 and Table 3 ). Thus, riskaverse contestants may accept one of "bank" offers in the early rounds of the show (when many boxes still remain unopened). In this case, only relatively less risk-averse contestants (with high probability weight ( ) 
Disappointment Aversion Theory
According to disappointment aversion theory, an individual experiences disappointment (elation) when a realized outcome of a lottery is below (above) its certainty equivalent. Ex ante, an individual anticipates future disappointment or elation and attempts to minimize ex post disappointment (Gul, 1991) . Formally, utility of a risky Deal UK and m is the number of disappointing prizes of lottery L that are higher than 26 When contestants receive a monetary offer for a distribution of eight (five) equiprobable prizes, at least two (one) of these prizes are (is) at least 1,000 times higher than €5 in Affari Tuoi or £5 in Deal or No Deal UK. Thus, for any plausible level of risk aversion, the certainty equivalent of such lotteries is significantly above €5 or £5 i.e. five lowest prizes are disappointing outcomes. When contestants receive a monetary offer for a distribution of two prizes, one of which is below or equal to €5 or £5, the low prize is obviously a disappointing prize. In Affari Tuoi there are also two instances when a contestant received an offer for lotteries (€1,0.5;€0.50,0.5) and (€1,0.5;€0.20,0.5). In Deal or No Deal UK there are eight episodes when the "bank" made a monetary offer for a distribution of two prizes, both of which were less or equal to £5. We excluded these cases from current analysis.
€5 or £5 respectively. According to disappointment aversion theory, the higher is k , the lower is subjective utility of a risky lottery and the more likely is a contestant to accept a monetary offer from the "bank".
27
Contrary to the theoretical prediction, Table 12 shows that Affari Tuoi contestants tend to accept "bank" offers less frequently when they face lotteries with a high number of small disappointing prizes. However, this tendency is not statistically significant.
Results are more mixed for Deal or No Deal UK contestants. On the one hand, there is evidence of disappointment aversion among contestants who face a distribution of eight possible prizes. Specifically, contestants confronted with one disappointing prize accept "bank" offers significantly less frequently than contestants for whom two or three out of eight prizes are disappointingly low. On the other hand, British contestants facing two to five odds of receiving £5 or less tend to accept "bank" offers less often than contestants, who face only one or no disappointing prizes at all (among five possible prizes). Thus, contestants do not appear to be systematically averse to small disappointing prizes. Contestants representing the adult population of Italy and United Kingdom face a sequence of binary choices between a risky lottery and a monetary amount for certain.
Number (percentage) of
The show provides very high real incentives with prizes ranging from one cent to half a million euros. This allows us to investigate decision making in a domain that is not feasible in conventional laboratory experiments. However, we observe only few choices made by each contestant, which mostly restricts our analysis to a between-subject design.
Random events play a crucial role in this natural experiment, because they determine the distribution of possible prizes that a contestant is facing. This enables us to allocate contestants across randomized treatments. Assuming that a particular decision theory correctly represents contestants' preferences, we allocate contestants across two groups. In the first group, contestants face probability distributions that are relatively unfavorable according to the selected theory, while contestants in the second group are confronted with relatively attractive gambles (according to the same theory). The selected theory is tested by comparing behavior across these two artifactual treatments. This research methodology allows using data from natural experiments in television shows for testing virtually any research hypothesis even though the experimenter does not have any control over the course of such shows.
We test the predictions of ten well-known decision theories that are usually contested against each other for the best explanation of behavioral patterns observed in laboratory experiments. The main findings of this natural experiment can be summarized as follows. On the one hand, Deal or No Deal contestants clearly violate the assumption of risk neutrality and the assumption of loss aversion of prospect theory. On the other hand, contestants' behavior supports the assumption of regret aversion of regret theory and the fanning-out hypothesis of weighted utility and skew-symmetric bilinear utility theories. We find evidence of simple non-linear probability weighting but no evidence of rank-dependent probability weighting or disappointment aversion to low prizes.
It is important to emphasize that none of contestants actually violated expected utility theory or any of the generalized non-expected utility theories that incorporate the former as a special case. However, contestants managed to avoid ex post regret, which is difficult to reconcile with any other decision theory but regret theory, and revealed significantly higher risk aversion when facing stochastically dominating lotteries, which is predicted by decision theories that incorporate the fanning-out hypothesis. Obviously, these results have important implications for future theoretical work.
In contrast to numerous laboratory experiments that document rank-dependent probability weighting, our natural experiment provides no support for this phenomenon.
This somewhat surprising lack of evidence suggests that more empirical work has to be done outside the laboratory. Interestingly, the results of our natural experiment are nearly 
